Although religious movements are a powerful force in politics, there has been relatively little work that adequately analyses the relationship between communication technologies and Christian political mobilisation in the United States. In addressing this deficit, this article has three interrelated objectives. First, it traces the impact of media technology on the evangelical project, paying specific attention to radio and television, and argues that these two media have had a largely unifying influence. Second, it seeks a better understanding of the impact of the Internet upon evangelical organisations by reviewing relevant academic literature in the context of on-the-ground developments. In doing so, the authors argue that instead of working to facilitate greater unity among evangelicals, as radio and television did in the past, the Internet is instead fragmenting and polarising them. Third, and more speculatively, they discuss implications for a fragmented evangelical community, and call upon scholars to conduct more research into recent developments in communications technology as it relates to Christian political mobilisation in the United States. Combined, these goals work to illustrate the complex relationship between media, religious organisations, and mass political mobilisation.
Introduction
By its nature, civil society serves as a forum through which competing interests vie for the support of the masses, rendering the cultural dimensions of a given society anything but static. In the United States, evangelical Christianity has long engaged in this process and today serves as an important source of identity for millions of Americans. Politically, for the better part of 30 years and despite their many differences, evangelicals have presented a unified front in their support for conservative Republican candidates. For instance, in 2004, 26 .5 million selfdescribed evangelical and born-again Christians, 78% of white evangelical voters and one-fifth of all voters, cast their ballot to re-elect George W. Bush.
1 By 2008 and despite an unparalleled religious-voter outreach the likes of which had never before been attempted by any previous Democratic nominee, evangelical voters again emerged as the Grand Old Party's (GOP) most reliable and sizeable base of support. Such a fact could be taken as attesting to the political cohesive ground of America's Christian Right. Yet even this ground is by no means unshakable and is already showing signs of erosion from within.
While the likes of Pat Robertson, James Dobson and Jerry Falwell have worked tirelessly to cultivate a conservative religious movement in the United States, many of today's emerging evangelical leaders are increasingly calling evangelical Christianity to task. In doing so, leaders such as Brain McLaren and Richard Cizik, and groups such as Emergent Village and the Evangelical Environmental Network, pose a serious threat to the unity of the Religious Right by serving as a source of internal division. Moreover, given the current contours of the new media environment, it is unlikely that the Religious Right will be able to overcome these present obstacles unscathed, as much of its strength has historically come through its utilisation of communication technology. The technological tools that helped to establish the political and cultural dominance of the Religious Right have since been surpassed by newer communicative means. As a result, the monologue that has for so long silenced theological dissent has since given way to a more organic and authentic dialogue.
In approaching this phenomenon this article has three goals. First, it will trace the impact of media technology on the evangelical project by focusing specific attention on radio and television, while taking into account the historical conditions surrounding their accent. Second, and most importantly, this article seeks a better understanding of the impact of the Internet on evangelical organisations by reviewing relevant academic literature in the context of on-the-ground developments. In doing so, it will be argued that instead of working to facilitate greater unity among evangelicals, as radio and television did in the past, the Internet is instead fragmenting and polarising evangelical Christianity. Third, and more speculatively, the authors discuss the implications for a fragmented evangelical community, while calling upon social science scholars to take these recent developments seriously. Combined, these goals work to illustrate the complex relationship between media, religious organisations, and mass political mobilisation in the United States.
Media developments and the mobilisation and unification of American evangelicals
For purposes of mobilisation, religion often serves as an important motivating factor due to the value framework of its adherents. In this respect, religious zeal often negates the necessity for incentives that might otherwise be needed to propel an individual to action. Yet religious zeal is not the only advantage, and, according to Marostica, religious organisations have other inherent benefits that their secular counterparts often lack.
2 For instance, religious organisations invariably have holy leaders who find themselves capable of using their status to further various social and political ends. Providing further assistance to these leaders is the strong sense of collective identity fostered by assuredness of one's own theology. Moreover, many of the mechanical needs of mass mobilisation can be readily addressed by religious organisations through pre-existing mechanisms such as tithes and offerings. The combined effect of these advantages, coupled with the deeply held world-views of religious people, inevitably make mobilisation efforts less tedious.
Yet while the mobilisation of a single faith community, such as a house of worship, or even an entire denomination, may prove comparatively easy in contrast to secular efforts, uniting multiple religious organisations is no simple task, particularly when each group is assured of their respective righteousness. The fact that evangelicals have emerged today as both a sizeable and reliable coalition for 2 Marostica, 'Religion and Global Affairs'. conservative causes and political candidates begs a fundamental question, namely: how is it that evangelicals overcame long-held denominational differences and forged ahead with the creation of a shared identity and accepted core values? The following will address this question through an examination of the historical relationship between media usage and evangelical organisation.
In the wake of the Scopes Monkey Trial, 3 journalists from across the United States made it quite fashionable to criticise Christian fundamentalists. To escape this unwanted and often abusive attention, many fundamentalists simply withdrew from the public sphere and began building 'their own separatist networks of schools, churches, Bible colleges, and, of course, radio stations'. 4 In doing so, fundamentalists were unwittingly laying the foundations 'for the emergence of neo-evangelism in the 1950s, a movement of intellectually and culturally engaged Christians'.
5 These religious institutes established by inward looking fundamentalists emerged as an important cog in the formation of a much broader unified collective identity.
6 This result, however, owes much to the growth of the American population throughout the first half of the century, which subsequently resulted in a rising demand for protestant ministers and trained laity. The growing number of fundamentalist-founded Bible institutes met this demand and, in addition to their educational activities, often ran publishing houses and organised week-long summer Bible conferences that 'supplied staff evangelists for revival meetings and provided churches with guest preachers '. 7 As bonds between the various branches of Protestant Christianity began maturing, advertisements for denominational colleges, which had previously appealed largely to adherents of affiliate denominations, were soon appearing in the publications and periodicals of other denominations. As enrolment to these colleges rose, the various branches of Christianity came into ever-closer proximity, helping to forge both a shared identity and a dense network of social and religious support. Yet these ties did not simply end with student populations. One activity closely associated with the Bible colleges of the day was religious revivals and these proved a tremendous success with the general public and attracted Christians from all traditions. Considering the success of such revivals, one journalist of the day commented:
Methodist bishop, a Baptist evangelist, a Presbyterian professor, a Lutheran pastor, a Christian layman and a Rescue Mission superintendent could stand on the same platform and preach the common tenets of the Christian faith while multitudes of believers wept and rejoiced together as if some glorious news had for the first time bust upon their ears. The 'Scopes Monkey Trial' is an infamous 1925 trial in which the State of Tennessee tried high school biology teacher John Scopes for violating the Butler Act, an act which prohibited educators from teaching on the subject of evolution. The trial gained considerable public notoriety and was largely seen as a showdown between science and Christian fundamentalism. 4 Hendershot, 'God's Angriest Man ', 385. 5 Ibid. 6 Moen, 'The Evolving Politics of the Christian Right'; see also Carpenter, 'Fundamentalist Institutions'. 7 Carpenter, 'Fundamentalist Institutions ', 66. 8 Ibid., 70.
stations ', 9 and had a radio staff of nearly 300 eager men and women who busied themselves by visiting churches to raise awareness of Moody's religious broadcasts. Yet, despite the eagerness with which evangelicals greeted the advent of radio, it proved, nonetheless, a difficult medium to tap.
Many of the problems evangelicals initially ran into were, however, self-inflicted. For example, by 1943 every one of the major national broadcasters had pulled commercial evangelism from the air, 10 largely due to inflammatory remarks made by fundamentalists and other religious commentators over the airwaves. Arguably the most notorious offender was Father Charles E. Coughlin. Although a Roman Catholic priest (and thus unaffiliated with Protestant evangelism), Coughlin succeeded in scaring major broadcasters away from paid religious programming with his 'bellicose attacks on communists, socialists, international bankers, Jews, labour union leaders, and finally, President Franklin Roosevelt'.
11 Consequently, when it came time to renew Coughlin's contract, broadcasters, fearing political reprisal, simply chose not to, citing a newly established National Association of Broadcasters' code of ethics which barred 'controversial speakers'.
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As a result of the fiery and often inflammatory remarks made on air by evangelical preachers, national broadcasters increasingly chose to air the more benign sermons of the National Council of Churches (NCC), an umbrella group which included most mainline Protestant denominations, but which also had ties with the Catholic Church and Judaism. In exchange for providing this 'sustaining time' to the NCC, which had to be given away free of charge, broadcasters in turn earned credit which could then be used as evidence that their stations were providing an invaluable public service, thereby better assuring the renewal of their public broadcast licence. As a result of these developments, many evangelical preachers found themselves unable to secure radio time on any of the major national networks and were subsequently forced to take their religious broadcasts elsewhere. That elsewhere proved to be among America's smaller, more rural local radio stations, whose owners were not only glad to sell their airtime, but were also pleased to see a reduction in their own dead-air.
Over the next decade and a half, evangelical radio continued to blossom. Many ministries busied themselves with improving the quality of their own programming, as this was in itself a means of soliciting ever greater donations. With time, and as radio evangelism proved to be a profitable business, entire stations were bought by various ministries. As a result, radio evangelists, throughout the 1940s and 1950s, grew quite adept at running and maintaining their own radio programmes and, in a growing number of cases, their own stations, while the NCC and other mainline Protestant groups increasingly grew dependent upon the charity of the country's major radio broadcasters.
In 1960, the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) announced that it would no longer require radio and television broadcasters to give away their 'sustaining time' free of charge, thus enabling station owners to sell this time to the highest bidder. Unable to afford the price demanded by major broadcasters, the NCC and other moderate religious voices were effectively forced off the air, while evangelical ministries, themselves flush with cash, quickly swooped in to fill the gap 9 Ibid., 67. 10 Hangen, Reclaiming the Dial. left by their absence. As a result, 1960 is often regarded today as a cultural milestone marking the '''virtual silencing'' of mainline churches in mass media'. 13 Moreover, with these FCC regulations firmly in place, evangelicals undertook extensive efforts to further cultivate ties among America's many Protestant bodies, as the rapid expansion of religious broadcasting itself reoriented evangelical Christianity towards ever greater ecumenical ministries. One of the biggest catalysts for this was the advent of televangelism, which saw its audience grow from some 5 million in the late 1960s to nearly 25 million by the mid-1980s.
14 Leading this charge was Pat Robertson who founded the Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN) in 1961, though this was quickly followed by Paul Crouch's Trinity Broadcasting Network (TBN) and Jim Bakker's PTL Network (PTL). Together, these three networks stood as giants in an industry soon saturated with smaller, more regionally based religious programming.
Understanding how media creates political and social polarities
Like radio before it, televangelism worked to bridge denominational divides through its mainstreaming effect. In this regard, regular television viewing works to create a confluence of ideas and 'a coming-together of attitudes'. 15 When viewed 'heavily' and by 'divergent' groups, what results is the homogenisation or 'mainstreaming' of political and social views. In this regard, however, the term 'mainstreaming' ought not to be viewed as a moderation of political attitudes, but rather, as it has been previously stated, the coming together, or homogenisation of such attitudes. As such, the mainstreaming effect of American televangelism effectively brought its viewers into closer political proximity with those of televangelists themselves, thereby moving viewers to the conservative end of the political spectrum. 16 Moreover, once an individual is caught up in the mainstreaming effect, there is a natural tendency to seek out viewpoints with which they already agree. This works to reinforce pre-existing biases and moves an individual to ever greater extremes.
17 Thus, by appealing to individuals who felt unnerved by the significant social upheavals of the 1960s, televangelists worked to foster a community of conservative Christians whose numbers grew as the public increasingly gained access to cable television. Meanwhile, as evangelical Christianity found itself caught in the mainstreaming effect, both the message of televangelists and the viewers themselves gradually crept towards the conservative right.
18
In contrast, the emergence of grassroots organisations represents a historic shift away from institutional reliance and appeals directly to participatory engagement. Activities such as these have not only changed the nature of political participation, but have also demonstrated why a new conceptualisation of civic engagement is needed.
As a growing number of individuals find their way online, and as regular daily habits change, 22 challenging new questions arise concerning the complexities of contemporary social relations, civic engagement and contested political activity. For instance, the widely adopted practice of conscience driven consumption, such as the purchasing of 'fair-trade' goods, certified 'organic' produce and 'conflict-free' diamonds, illustrates the difficulties in measuring contemporary civic engagement, as this sort of activity is nearly impossible to quantify. The Internet, however, aids in this practice by empowering citizens to quickly and easily find information that would otherwise require a significant investment of time. As a result, thresholds for civic engagement are lowered and citizens become increasingly aware of their own political power. 23 In addition to this, the Internet is also fostering new networks and repositories of citizenship by enabling connections between far flung individuals and groups with shared and similar interests. Serving as a vehicle through which bottomup grassroots activity is more easily achieved, the Internet has evolved into an effective medium through which the power of individuals is greatly enhanced and is better positioned to serve larger collective goods.
In taking these social implications one step further, Bimber asserts that the Internet has led America towards 'accelerated pluralism'. 24 The premise of Bimber's theory is that society is undergoing significant fragmentation whereby interest-based group politics are shifting towards more fluid issue-based group politics, resulting in declining institutional coherence. The Internet enables this process by serving as a medium through which individuals with similar interests can freely engage one another.
25 As Hopkins has observed, cyberspace enables individuals to better 'overcome place based limitation to communication', thus allowing 'stamp collectors, organic gardeners and knitting enthusiasts in Australia (to) exchange news, gossip and items of interest with similar enthusiasts in Mexico and Mauritius'. 26 In some cases, 'access to the Internet provides the opportunity to participate in networks and interests communities that would be unavailable otherwise'. 27 parties, and even religious coalitions, the shift from an interest-based group politics in favour of issue-based group politics poses serious challenges to consolidated positions of power.
New frontiers in evangelical Christianity
Attributing recent cultural changes among evangelical Christians to advancements in communication technology is a bold assertion and indeed a variety of contemporary phenomena could be leading to these alterations: religion, like society, is anything but static. What is, however, frustrating in writing an article that attempts to blend two areas of previously unrelated academic work are the limitations set in place by the lack of any meaningful quantitative data. While this article makes no claim that ICTs are solely responsible for the changing attitudes of evangelicals, it nonetheless asserts linkages. Yet given the current academic deficit in this area of study, any assessment which seeks a better understanding of the potential significance of this position must rely on empirical evidence. Fortunately, such examples are widespread.
Evangelical environmentalism
Arguably, the most notable and widely discussed emerging cultural trend among evangelicals is the 'care of creation' movement. For groups affiliated with this cause, environmental activism is not simply a civic activity, but rather a biblical mandate. One of the largest evangelical organisations to take up environmental protection has been the Evangelical Environmental Network (EEN). Founded by the Revd Jim Ball in 1993 as an extension of Evangelicals for Social Action, the EEN describes itself as a 'non-profit organisation that seeks to educate, inspire, and mobilise Christians in their effort to care for God's creation, to be faithful stewards of God's provision, and to advocate for actions and policies that honor God and protect the environment'. More recently, the EEN has teamed up with National Association of Evangelicals (NAE), the largest representative evangelical body in the country, whose membership includes 60 different Protestant denominations. In 2006, the NAE, led in large part by Richard Cizik, the NAE's vice-president of governmental affairs, wrote to President Bush and members of Congress urging them to take greater action on climate change, stating, 'our allegiance to Jesus Christ demands that the threat of climate change no longer be ignored '. 34 Responding to this call, Focus on the Family Chairman James Dobson and two-dozen other evangelical leaders called upon the NAE to oust Cizik as his emphasis on climate change was moving support away from the 'great moral issues of our time'.
35 Yet the NAE did not agree to the demands of the powerful Dobson, but instead reaffirmed their support of Cizik and his ministries.
Today, an increasing number of voices is joining Cizik's call for better environmental care. Among them are some heavy hitters within the evangelical community. For his part, Pat Robertson has since changed his stance on climate change and has adopted environmental protection as a key component of his ministries. In doing so, Robertson has joined the ranks of Billy Graham and Rick Warren, best-selling author of the 'Purpose-Driven Life'. Further still, groups such as Restoring Eden, which organises evangelical college students and trains them to lobby politicians, or Green Vineyard, which educates local churches in green methods, are cropping up all over the American religious landscape. Yet far from bridging this growing theological divide, creation care's growing support only exacerbates tensions between figures such as Warren and Cizik and Dobson and Focus on the Family. With such tensions inflamed, some evangelicals worry about the political ramifications. E. Calvin Beisner of the Interfaith Stewardship Alliance is one of those concerned, stating, 'I am afraid that in their rush to elevate concerns about global warming, some evangelicals fell prey to a strategy to split their vote'.
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The Internet seems to have played a substantial role in getting the creation care movement to where it is today. Peter Illyn, formerly of the EEN and now head of Restoring Eden, commented that one of the biggest obstacles that confronted evangelical environmentalists was that they were a 'very scattered audience'.
37 Illyn contends that, with the Internet, all of that has changed, and now the problem facing evangelical environmentalism isn't a lack of interest, but rather the presence of too many voices at the table, what he calls 'white noise'. After all, these days, 32 38 Lending further support to Illyn's premise that the Internet has enabled the creation care movement to take off is A.J. Swoboda of the Four Square Church. He asserts that, without the Internet, he and others like him would never have been able to connect with the creation care network, nor would they have been able to do eco-theology work. According to Swoboda, 'The Internet has played a crucial role in who are the Diaspora of creation care folks in evangelicalism in a way that they wouldn't naturally be able to connect'.
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The emergent Church If environmentalism was the only significant tension evangelicals faced, then it would be foreseeable that certain accommodations could be made by the older evangelical guard to mitigate what has become a very public feud. Unfortunately for James Dobson and others like him, another significant and rapidly growing theological movement is capturing the attention of Christian worshippers and drawing adherents towards its cause. This is emergent Christianity, although emerging Christians are not easily defined. While many participants would describe themselves as evangelical, or postevangelical, followers of this movement -or 'conversation' as they prefer -they tend to be younger evangelicals who find themselves 'dissatisfied with the dominant expression of ''contemporary'' church'. 40 Yet far from seeking a simple change in worship style, emerging Christians are instead calling for a radical reconceptualisation of the evangelical project by focusing specific attention on missional work, particularly as it applies to the 'post-modern world'. As Amy Green explains, emerging Christians are drawing less from traditional sources such as Sunday services and turning instead to friends, online social sites, celebrity pop culture, and podcasts for their spirituality. Often they are cynical of today's church leaders but eager to probe, discuss, and learn from their teachings. Politically, they are less motivated by issues such as abortion and homosexuality and moved instead by environmentalism, genocide in Africa, and poverty.
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In placing significant emphasis on causes such as poverty, social justice, and the environment, which have either been largely neglected by the established Christian Right or outright opposed by them, emergents are working to fundamentally reshape the church by removing the 'sterile polarities that have defined the church in the modern era: liberal vs. conservative, traditional vs. contemporary, reason vs. experience, faith vs. science, mega church vs. maintenance church '. 42 Emergent Christians, like those on the creation care front, rely heavily upon social networking sites and other forms of Internet media to better organise their efforts, spread their word, and proselytise new supporters. 43 Yet the social impact of Internet technologies may not be limited to the mere creation of new interest groups within the evangelical community. So previously if you've got theological questions, you went to the pastor, and if you go back hundreds of years, the preacher was the authority on religious matter, and up until recently and in certain places that is still the case. But now what you are seeing is these minor voices, [and] some of these people who are speaking at the margins are just as acceptable as the monologue. You can go online and find all sorts of things and therein is the beauty and danger. You can find whatever you want. So if you're not really wanting accountability and you're looking like you're not wanting community, you can find whatever it is you already believe and say, 'wow, I'm done'. But if you're responsible with your faith life and you want to be engaged in dialogue with folks and Christian folks and you want to be challenged by a community of accountability support and love, then you can find some things that might be true and bring it back to a body of folks who are flesh and blood and say, 'here are some things I'm really grappling with'. So it's made minor voices . . . that speak from the margins more audible . . .
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On this broader point, Tickle is also in agreement:
As the Internet becomes the place for theological conversation and as those conversations are formed not by seminary trained, and I would say from an emergent point of view, not from any seminary programmed serving some kind of hierarchical or overseer, as those conversations are happening, we are getting people who realise that they have strong opinions or strong questions about theological issues and that they can ask them and decide for themselves on the basis of the conversation which may or may not be informed by the academically or theologically trained.
45
The Reverend Jim Wallis has also taken notice of the rapidly changing set of circumstances presented by the new media environment and its transformative impact both for people of faith and the broader American public. He notes:
The Religious Right has been able to win when they have been able to maintain and control a monologue on the relationship between faith and politics. But when a dialogue begins about the extent of 'moral values' issues and what biblical Christians should care about, the Religious Right begins to lose. The best news of all for the American church and society is this: The monologue of the Religious Right is over, and a new dialogue has begun.
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That Wallis is indirectly commenting on the fact that new modes of communication have arrived on the scene and are contesting established social hierarchies is nothing new. Nor was it when Pierce and Lovrich noted that 'access to the Internet provides the opportunity to participate in networks and interests communities that would be unavailable otherwise'. 47 Yet this is precisely what is happening across America's religious landscape and seems to provide further evidence in support of Bimber's theory of accelerated pluralism. If we are to take seriously the magnitude of such a change, we would do well to remember Fukuyama's observations concerning the adverse social effects of such pluralism. In recognising the need people have to belong to groups, Fukuyama finds that in today's information-rich society, 'people are picking and choosing their values on an individual basis, in ways that link them with smaller communities of like-minded 44 Interview with Callad Keefe-Perry on Emergent Village, July 27, 2009. 45 Interview with Phyllis Tickle on Emergent Village, August 21, 2009. 46 Wallis, 'An Evangelical Climate Change'. 47 Pierce and Lovrich, 'Internet Technology Transfer and Social Capital', 53. folk'. 48 Yet this tendency to build 'in-group' solidarity comes at the expense of perceived outsiders. For societies with too many tightly bonded groups or networks (as may soon be the case among evangelicals), the risk of social fragmentation and community strife increases. 49 Given these conditions, it may be the case that the social ramifications of greater Internet usage are putting the political gains of the Religious Right over the past 30 to 40 years in jeopardy. As a consequence of this development, it is difficult to imagine a future in which the Religious Right continues to enjoy the same sort of political presence as it did just a few short years ago.
Conclusion
Although religious communities are acknowledged as politically significant, there has been insufficient work done to date that probes the relationship between forms of communication and their political mobilisation. As a step towards filling this gap, this article has argued that different media have divergent effects on the potential for political organisation and mobilisation and then applied this thesis to the American Christian Right. Through a historical review, it was shown that use of television and radio had a largely unifying effect on the Christian Right, through the process of 'mainstreaming', due in part to the monologue-like character of these media. However, it has been posited that the Internet, as means and method of communication and mobilisation, is having the opposite effect. Due to its ability to facilitate dialogues and to enable scattered groups of people with shared concerns to communicate, adoption of the Internet is leading to the fragmentation and polarisation of the Christian Right, as interest-based politics is being superseded by issue-based politics. Two case studies, environmental evangelicals and emergent Christians, were explored and shown to support this position. As has been indicated, however, the next step is to continue with qualitative and quantitative research in order to develop a rigorous account and further deepen our understanding of the relationship between different forms of media, mobilisation and collective action. To do so is critical in understanding the political impact of the Christian Right in times to come.
